

# Ellsberg Lect. 5

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Thank you. OK I asked for that announcement to be made early on. When she said that you must be there, that is not a requirement of the course needless to say. I will be there as it happens at the vigil and I think at the civil disobedience the next morning, but I will not be taking attendance. It's not obligatory to attend although what led me to do this is in part the fact that the following week when we don't meet is Martin Luther King's birthday, anniversary and I think in honor of that occasion one can't do better than to... What? Abe Lincoln? Oh, Washington? Oh, Oh, good. Now you see Washington and Lincoln worked before Ghandi had demonstrated nonviolence as effectively as he did, before Martin Luther King had learned what he had from Ghandi and from Rosa Parkes (??) Incidentally, as far as the course is concerned, those of you who have learned from the course that the kinds of weapons being sold to each other by the military industrial complex and the Wincon people, if you have learned that those are indeed necessary for our survival and what we need to have you should make your appearance there and back them up and buy a weapon. You are paying for them anyway as a taxpayer. Nonviolently, obviously.

I'll tie up a couple of loose ends from last time. Somebody came up to me last time and mentioned that in my discussion of bank tellers some of it was obsolete because she, as a bank teller... (Is she here tonight in the course?) had been instructed to hand over anything she was asked right essentially as a teller. But that is actually as a result largely of the series of successful jobs that were done in the period I was talking about in '58-'59. At that time the tellers were really much less

certain as to what they ought to do and there was more significance that most of them chose to hand stuff over to people with combs and glasses of water and what not. But that did remind me that there was a footnote in this original paper of mine in '59 that after I had put out the hypothesis that at the Chemical Corn Exchange Bank all you had to do was ask for \$5,000 and you're in—point anything at them, cookies, milk bottles, rolled newspapers.... But the management of the Chemical Corn Exchange system had apparently reached a similar conclusion. They began the installation of a system that would photograph customers automatically. So nothing to be threatened you see. They got out of coercion. The bank robber couldn't say, "Don't push that button, don't photograph me," or whatever. It's all done automatically. We'll be talking about out of the teller's hands. In the course of the installation a customer obtained several thousand dollars from a teller with a note that simply began, "Give me" and made no mention whatever of weapon or punishment. He walked out with the money past workmen installing the new photographic apparatus. On a subsequent attempt he was unmasked as an accountant who had taken each time a short break from his office work. Which also illustrates the point that there are risks to these things.

Another point I think that was raised more seriously about some of the earlier lectures was put in this fashion to me just a few minutes ago. That one of the students had commented, "You are talking about tellers and bank robbers," that's the example here, "and the implication was drawn that the U.S. was the bank robber." Because I've been talking



about U.S. nuclear threats largely. That wasn't the implication at the time of my lecture at all. Nor is it now. And the notion that... the point was made now by this student, "Is not the U.S. the teller in most cases?"

Now if you recall... How many have actually read the lecture which is on the recommended reading? Anybody? OK. Then I'm not repeating. I feel just as well here. But the point I made in the lecture was that the tactic was of course also available to the teller. The kind of tactic we were talking about. It's symmetric to that extent. And in fact in the lecture (I'm not sure I said it in the lecture yesterday) but in the written lecture on the list (the point is made at some length in the third lecture called, "Presidents as Perfect Detonators,") that the trip wire effect, the tactic, rather, is not only open to those who are making deterrent threats—who are protecting a status quo as the teller is protecting a status quo—but in fact that is the nature of our strategy in NATO and, it turns out, many other parts of the world. More than most people realize.

Quite explicitly it has been our tactic in NATO for some time. The idea that through a semi-automatic process an incursion, an invasion, an aggression by the Soviet Union into Western Europe would encounter U.S. troops and that would in turn trigger processes which would not immediately, but in a dynamic process over time, lead to the destruction of the northern hemisphere. To say that is to suggest I think why such exotic examples as bank robbers or, for that matter, Hitler, whom I will be discussing a bit more tonight, offer themselves as historical examples here.

I have put on reserve something that I just reread this afternoon for the first time in several years—some notes actually a long letter that I wrote to Harrison Salisbury who wrote a book about the Pentagon Papers episode in part called Without Fear or Favor and he had referred to my madman theory in the lectures that I gave (in the Lowell Lectures) which he thought had had a lot of influence he concluded on Henry Kissinger and I found that he had misinterpreted what I had in mind very strongly and I don't want that to occur here. So I think my answer to that—what I really meant by those lectures and how they fit in with my own thinking—will in fact be of interest to people.

Again, that's recommended reading, not required reading. I should also mention administratively here. I don't think it was mentioned Larry, the other reading we put on the list? The Desmond Ball paper on command and control which is an extremely good paper on the vulnerability of command and control, the bottom line of which is the extreme unlikelihood that a nuclear war can be controlled and thus can be limited and thus can be survived. Say that more directly, he gives a very detailed description of the likely breakdown of the nervous system—the command control system—of both sides or all the parties to a nuclear conflict after a few tens or dozens of nuclear weapons have been exploded and thus the extreme unlikelihood of being able to limit a nuclear war even if that is what you are threatening to do and planning to do. Now that's a recommended piece but I recommend it very strongly.

Also, what else did we put on? Yes, a paper comparing our coercive process in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the process of coercing North

Viet Nam in particular under Lyndon Johnson. I wrote that paper (it's a draft paper) in 1970 before Nixon's bombings of Viet Nam had taken the proportions that it later did take. But the comparison I think again will be interesting to you. That's again recommended reading.

A third thing that is recommended is an introduction that I wrote to a book on the Rocky Flats civil disobedience action in 1978 and that gives my testimony also some part of papers on the war. This is all in the library now and will be on the recommended. None of this is required. It occurs to me that part of that introduction was my sworn testimony at my trial for the Rocky Flats civil disobedience and was the first time I think publicly, one of the few times, that I discussed an aspect of the Quemoy Crisis and elsewhere that I'll be talking about later tonight.

Final administrative note here I am going to try to cover quite a bit tonight so we'll take two short breaks and instead of having a lot of discussion back and forth tonight I am proposing that next week be largely discussion. So an inducement for those of you who feel that you haven't had a chance to ask enough questions or have things on your mind. I hope you will come Tuesday night then and we'll have a lot of discussion. As for tonight, if you find me saying things that seem contradictory (or crazy as some people have pointed out) do raise your hand. Or if you can't hear me. And let me know that and I may be able to address it right away. And for those of you who are in the graduate seminar... How many are here from that? OK. An assignment for you tonight and next week. I would like each of you in fact to think of at



least one or two things where you think I am wrong. That you can argue with. Rack your brains. Make up something. Because I want to have some points that I'll learn from and I would like to hear myself responding and saying things that I haven't thought before. So that'll be from tonight's lecture (or previous lectures) and next week as well.

Coming back now to the relation of last week's material and this week's to the world—to the course. It is not as somebody suggested to me here after the class, it is not the case that I regard the United States as the problem in the world when it comes to our possible extinction—or to the use of nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary. The material I was giving last week actually of course was written in '58, '59, when I took it for granted on the one hand that to take Hitler or bank robbers as my example of a blackmailer or a threatener was to make it quite clear that these were not tactics I was recommending, or thought highly... Certainly in those days to use Hitler (or for that matter Dulles) as one's example made it unnecessary to state openly that these were tactics that seemed dangerous or had many drawbacks in those days.

The point of emphasizing that there is a coherence to the tactics of a blackmailer or a threatener is going to enable you to understand better certain aspects of certain people's behavior as being behavior that is directed toward making threats credible in a situation where that may be difficult and complicated and dangerous. My emphasis that such tactics can work, then, should be understood as suggesting why it is that we might have to expect such tactics from people in the world. That in desperate situations they may be drawn to behave in ways that look both

incomprehensible and crazy and dangerous to outsiders and indeed they may be—this behavior may be all those things. And yet it may have a predicatable quality to it if you have this intellectual framework or empirical framework with which to understand it.

Specifically, the emphasis on the tactics of madness or unpredictability—the possibility of deliberately lowering one's own control over a situation and over a process, or of exhibiting characteristics that suggest that it is out of your control—suggest themselves not in general in bargaining situations, but in a very special kind. This was something that Salisbury did not draw correctly so I want to make it very clear. I was talking about a very peculiar bargaining situation in which the only available threat (or the most effective available threat) is one that amounts to mutual destruction. It approaches a suicidal threat—or at least a threat which would be catastrophic for the threatener to carry out.

The reason that that seemed to me relevant in 1958 was that nuclear weapons in a world where the threatener is not the only nation to have nuclear weapons has that character. Even if you are superior. Unless you can be virtually certain. Which is mad in an unrealistic way. Unless you are virtually certain that you can eliminate the ability of your opponent or your opponent's allies to use nuclear weapons back, then even if some sense a win is possible (as we are still told it is) the result can be catastrophic for the person carrying out that threat. So it poses the problems either of a bank robber confronting a teller with a hand grenade, or a teller confronting a bank robber (as I suggested last

time) with a hand grenade, which he offers to explode if the bank robber doesn't give himself up. It works either way.

The history of the Hitler period which exemplified this situation and the history of the threats prior to '58 and '59 when I gave those lectures and the history since that time does seem very relevant today.

There was a time when the United States had either a monopoly or an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons. When Harry Truman dropped them on Nagasaki and Hiroshima for example, when he threatened them in 1948 over Berlin when the Soviet Union had not yet exploded a nuclear device. In 1953 when Eisenhower threatened nuclear weapons to end the war in Korea again he had effectively a monopoly at that time. To threaten weapons under such circumstances you don't have to be mad to be effective in this sense. It might be mad in a sense to be willing to threaten or to carry out massacre on that scale but not in the same sense as if that genocide were also suicidal.

But the period in which in fact a threat of nuclear weapons became self destructive did not set in in the late sixties although it was true by that time. It was believed to be true in the late fifties. In fact it wasn't at that time. Our superiority remained immense. But in the period of the Quemoy crisis that I will be talking about, that was in 1958 which was the height of the intelligence belief in the missile gap. Sputnik had been used a year before, Henry Kissinger had written his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, from which the title of this course is drawn, the year before in 1957, on the understanding that the types of threats that John Foster Dulles was famous for making publicly—threats



of massive retaliation, understood to be threats of allout war—were obsolete by '57 or '58 because they were so clearly and absolutely suicidal to carry out.

Kissinger's effort at that time, then, was to find another way (other than Dulles's) to harness the destructive power of nuclear weapons to U.S. foreign policy and nuclear U.S. political power. What I have said is the struggle (not just of Kissinger who wasn't in the government at that time) but of every government since 1945. How to justify the cost, how to exploit the technological lead that we've always had. To make use in our foreign policy of this destructive power. When using the destructive power appears suicidal (when you use it in an allout way) we find statesmen looking for other ways to harness that power than the threat of allout attack. And Kissinger's suggestion at that time was limited nuclear war. The initiation by the U.S. in Europe or elsewhere. He criticized the failure to use nuclear weapons in Korea or Indo China. Now in retrospect (as I said in my first lecture) he was somewhat off the mark. The nuclear weapons were used in Korea in '53 and in Indo China they were offered in '54. They were turned down by the French but they were used in '53 in the sense of being effectively threatened and threatened with what Eisenhower believed to have been success at that time. And may have been right.

Anyway, Kissinger was saying, we must be willing to go first. He was unaware of how willing Foster Dulles had really been. He believed Dulles had been basically bluffing. But the reality was that it was not Dulles basically behind those threats. It was Eisenhower and Eisenhower was not

bluffing. And the other side backed down in Korea. So as I say Kissinger's solution at that time was a limited war notion—tactical nuclear weapons. He suggested that the ground rules be pressed by the United States that you would limit the weapons you use to 500 kilotons (that's half a megaton, 500,000 tons equivalent of TNT, quite large weapon actually). And as various people pointed out he had made an arithmetic error. He thought that the destructive power of the weapons was proportional to the cube root of the explosive power and it happens to be proportional to the square of the cube root. So the destruction would be a good deal greater than he imagined if his tactics had been used. But you know, nobody's perfect. His mistake was no worse than others had been making all along.

The point is that in 1958 our leaders (Eisenhower, Dulles, not Henry Kissinger at that time) were in fact confronting a world that had been prematurely forecast as early as 1945. A world, as they believed, in which any use of nuclear weapons would lead to major thermonuclear retaliation by the Soviet Union. That was in fact the world was not as dangerous for their threats as they supposed at that time because Khrushchev was bluffing in a very strict sense. He had no capability to carry out the intercontinental threats that he occasionally made and he had only limited capability to carry out the medium range threats. And if he had carried those out he would have been subject to annihilation by U.S. strategic retaliation.

But the point is that world has arrived now. So if we are to find out how statesmen made the Hague in a world in which the threats really

*my believe*

are likely to be suicidal we can get some insight from finding out how statesmen behaved in earlier periods when they believed that to be true. And for that purpose the example of Hitler still is relevant because Hitler did in fact (contrary to what he often said) he was in fact well aware that a number of threats he was making were catastrophic if they failed to get the compliance that he sought at that time.

I'm not going to go in much detail into Hitler's work and I refer you to that. I said to people last night, "It's obvious." I should be obvious then that in describing these threats I am not talking about a tactic that I think is to be recommended to statesmen. It is the case that you can walk in to a bank it turns out, with a glass of water and say it's nitroglycerine and walk out with a bag full of hundred dollar bills. It has been proven. But it is not the way I would want my daughter to make her living in fact. And the dangers are very great.

On the other point. Is it only the United States, then, that is the danger in these situations? The Soviet Union has spend a trillion dollars on the kinds of weapons that we bought earlier in virtually every case and I am not confident that it did that only from a blind technological imitation. I can believe that the Soviet Union or some people in the Soviet Union see the potential usefulness of those weapons in the same terms as some people (not always our presidents) but as some people in our system (in our military, in our industry) have seen the usefulness of those weapons. So I believe that the Soviet buildup of some years has made the world much more dangerous for the Soviets as well as for the United States. And that one of the most urgent reasons to see



the arms race cut off now (if that can be done on a bilateral basis) is, in my opinion, not only the weapons that are coming on the U.S. side, but the exactly comparable same kinds of weapons that are coming on the Soviet side... and are appearing on the Soviet side.

And not of course only the Soviets. The longer this process goes on the more likelihood that the Iranians... the Iraqis (who have just turned to to deliberate ~~city busting missile~~ tactics, if you've noticed in the papers the last two days in their long war) will be conducting such attacks with their own nuclear weapons. And that prospect does make the world more dangerous. But not because it will be the first time that people have sought to harness this nuclear power. That has been done by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union for a long time. Any questions on that?

I wanted to preface this with... I'll repeat something that was here for the persistent people who stayed after the break last time. It was a long evening last time. You didn't all hear it and I can't pass up a chance to name drop like this so I will repeat it. It is relevant. Incidentally, tonight I do urge those who can to stay till the end because as I say there's a lot of material I want to cover and will be relevant to you.

Toward the end last time then I was commenting on a visit not far from here at San Clemente in 1970, a year after I had copied the Pentagon Papers as it happened and given them to Fulbright but six months before they actually came out. I visited San Clemente with a reporter named Lloyd Shearer from Parade. And he took me along to see Kissinger. And

Kissinger said on the first meeting as we were shaking hands with Hague at that point. This was now 1970 and before Kissinger was as famous as he came to be. In fact it wasn't I think until the peace is at hand television announcement that the White House ever allowed Henry Kissinger to be seen and heard on television. That was two years later in 1972 because that was something they did want Kissinger to say just before the election since Nixon knew it wasn't true—peace was not at hand. And they could not let him speak earlier because they didn't want to impress upon the American public the fact that we had a Secretary of State with a very strong German accent. And he hadn't yet gone to China so he wasn't known as the great negotiator yet.

But I'd known him for some time going back to his Harvard days in 1958, '59 and as I mentioned then to some of you his opening comment to Lloyd was, "I have learned more from Don Ellsberg than any other person on the subject of bargaining." And as I said I wanted you to know, those of your who didn't hear that last week what you are getting in this course here. That's going to be as I said on the cover of a book (if I ever write it) on negotiations, that little blurb from Henry Kissinger... "I have learned more from Don Ellsberg..." And as I said last time I really couldn't imagine what he was talking about when he said that.

I had worked for Kissinger on Viet Nam options a year and a half earlier, hadn't seen him in between and had really no thought for a moment as to what he could possibly be talking about. And then I got a very chilled feeling. One of those few occasions when the cliché of the hair rising on the back of your head seemed to apply because I recalled

what the lectures were he was talking about. "You have a very good memory." These were lectures I had given to his seminar in 1959, possibly '58.

I said, "You have a very good memory."

He said, "They were very good lectures."

But they were lectures about (as you will see from the lectures on file) Adolph Hitler's tactics in the late thirties before he came to grief in the eastern front and in the blitz—in the period when he had bloodless victories of an astounding sort by the use of massive threats and by the appearance of madness. This was in fact a period in which there were newspaper accounts that the administration (without specifying Kissinger) was cultivating the notion of erratic behavior over the Middle East to scare the Soviets from the use of Russian pilots manning Egyptian SAMs—Egyptian surface to air missiles—which they were doing covertly at that time. They are now doing it openly you notice in Lebanon and Syria. And to make them aware that they couldn't count on us to be rational and to be reasonable.

It was put out that was one of the reasons given for the Cambodian incursion. Something that looked crazy before it took place—crazy enough for four or five of Kissinger's staff members to resign from the White House in the only time that happened during the Viet Nam War. It looked that crazy. It looked as crazy to the American public. It was potentially even more disastrous than it turned out to be. Partly because, thanks to Congress, the American troops were pulled out of Cambodia after a month. But it was put out that in Nixon's mind and in



Kissinger's mind an advantage of that was the very impression of unpredictability that it gave. That it could teach a lesson around the world to the Russians in Egypt. That they couldn't count on what we would do. In fact there is a quote here from (don't have it right here but...) from the Jordan crisis of the very period when I was seeing Kissinger (I mean literally the same week actually) a Jordan crisis that... Nixon had actually given orders for bombing of Jordan by the sixth week, which Laird had deliberately sat on for a couple of days until Nixon thought better of it. But that Nixon's objective in that crisis (as Nixon and Kissinger both tell us in his memoirs) was to appear irrational and unpredictable.

So the fear that this engendered in me to hear that the special assistant to the president had those lectures in mind twenty years later, actually, ten years later, was very unnerving to me, disturbing. And confirmed some other suspicions I had as to what the overall policy was that they were pursuing at that time.

What then was the policy that I was referring to in those lectures that Kissinger recalled in these situations? I never then or now imagined as Harrison Salisbury did, that I had taught Henry Kissinger anything along these lines, or Richard Nixon, either. I think they were both born understanding coercion and threats of this kind. We could interview their parents I guess on this subject. But I'm sure they really had nothing to learn from me except some concepts conceivably which Kissinger (some descriptive concepts)... But after all I was simply trying not to tell Hitler how to do it, or anybody how to do it, but trying to analyze what Hitler had done descriptively.

One episode right at the very beginning of Hitler's career in this sense was very suggestive. As I said last time, the word bluff is used promiscuously, misleadingly, suggesting that threats have either an all or nothing character. That either one is determined to carry out the threat or determined not to carry out the threat, which we call a bluff. I've been thinking over (last week) a point that I raised last time which was that I hadn't been able to find a word which is the counterpart of bluff—a word for a threat that you do mean to carry out. And I think that the absence of such a word does suggest that there are two kinds of threats. There are threats that you mean to carry out, and there are bluffs—a special category of threats that you have no intention whatever of carrying out. And as I suggested, that is a very inadequate description.

In nearly every case of coercion of any significance, doubts are unavoidable about the likelihood that a threat will be carried out because the threat is costly and it is destructive, painful, costly, perhaps dangerous to carry it out. And there is usually a problem of making that credible. In order to make it credible you take steps to make it look more likely that you will carry it out. Not certain, but more likely. And the situation in which, I repeat, in which bank robbery, Hitler's threats, nuclear threats of the late fifties, nuclear threats today and in the late sixties, have in common is that, two aspects.

That on the one hand the victim or the subject of the threat does not have to be very sure that the threat will be carried out to be influenced

by it. As I said, his threshold, his critical risk, how sure he has to be that the threat will be carried out before he complies is very low. A small chance that the threat will be carried out is enough to be effective. But on the other hand, the circumstances of mutual destruction are such that it's hard for a person who appears totally in control of the policy and totally in command of himself in a normal way, self discipline, reasonable. It's hard for such a person to make the threat look credible at all—even a little bit. So we are interested then in threats that are not of zero probability but threats that may be of one percent, two percent, ten percent chance that they will be carried out. Is that a bluff? It may be enough to succeed and that is why such threats are made. At the same time it may not succeed. The bank robbers can be resisted eventually. Hitler of course eventually was resisted.

But in one of his very early episodes I want to comment on was his invasion of the Rhineland. In 1936. Without going into the history of it too much the Rhineland part of Germany had been demilitarized by the Versailles Treaty. And the Germans were prevented not only by treaty but by very strong commitments on the part of the British and French that they were not permitted to move any military forces into the Rhineland or to fortify it. That was a key to the French commitments to defend Poland or if they had gone into an alliance with Russia, which they didn't. But they were in an alliance with Poland (or had commitments to Poland) and it was essential to them that they be able to threaten Germany that they could move through this demilitarized zone with great ease if Germany should move against the East.



Germans as a whole regarded this as a great insult to their territorial integrity, to their rights as a sovereign nation. It defined them as a second class power, as a power that did not have rights as they are today to some extent in terms of nuclear weapons. So it was a very popular move to talk about moving into the Rhineland. But actually to do it was another matter because the French were strong committed to opposing that. In fact they were treaty bound to oppose it as guarantors of this treaty.

At that time of course the Germans had done very little rearmament. So their strength compared to the French, even without the British was infinitesimal. I'll quote from this lecture. You can read the whole story in there if you want, I'll just quote a few passages.

For the Germans at this point actual fighting, let alone victory, was out of the question. Only one division was sent into the Rhineland. Three battalions across the Rhine. Against them the French alone could have mobilized 90 divisions, with a hundred in reserve. And even without mobilization they could have whipped them with their ready covering forces alone. As it was the troops marched in at the generals' insistence with orders to retreat at once if they were fired upon.

So this was a total bluff. It was not a bluff for Hitler. Hitler was heavily committed on this point. Had there been firing and had the Germans had to retreat at that point he would have been ruined at that point. The generals were extremely reluctant to accept his authority on this point. They thought it was crazy and that the French and British were certain to carry out their commitments. And if so, disaster, humiliation at best. Hitler had a better theory at that time. He did

not have the authority that he later had which could have simply ordered them to go in and do their best. He had to accept the generals' requirement that there would be no fighting. That if the bluff was called they would retreat. So this is as close to a classic, traditional sense of bluff as you can come.

To do this at all with Hitler's degree of commitment he had to be virtually certain that the British and French would not move. His own critical risk was very low. And he was virtually certain. Even so, this was one time that he was affected by the states that this involved for him. He later said "The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve racking in my life." He said this again and again. "If the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs." His own generals were certain the French would march.

His theory was better than theirs. They saw that Germany should not accept more than the most minor risks. He saw that the risk was very low. Judging the French and English payoffs he saw their willingness to risk conflict, their critical risk was just as low as his or lower and he predicted confidently they would estimate the actual risk as not being low enough. For his opponents (and Hitler knew this and counted on it) had to contend with a madman. A player whose payoffs were obscure, changeable, and tended to be insane, who might not calculate his risks, or might take them even if he judged them high, who could not be counted on to do the sensible thing.

I won't read this all. The French did not march despite their treaty commitments. The Germans did proceed to fortify the Rhine thus locking the door against the French counterattack if the Germans should march East as they did later. For one thing the French had no suitable military counter to this. Their only plan called for general mobilization in the event of major conflict. In fact, as I say, the conflict would not have been major but they didn't know that. And the

French generals, understanding that the risk was very low of opposing Hitler, still felt that if they were to undertake the costs of mobilization (which was very financially costly at that point—calling up reserves, and socially costly) there had to be no risk at all. Hitler had correctly judged them.

"Germans might welcome us with shots," the French high command pointed out. There might be war and if there was any chance of that there must be general mobilization. This was their only contingency plan. Very much in my mind as I wrote that in 1958 was the fact (it was well known and turned out to be the case when I saw the plans) that the United States essentially had no plans for limited war at that time. Confronted with a limited challenge by the Soviet Union we virtually had no plans other than allout nuclear war for a variety of reasons. That was a widespread criticism of the Dulles-Eisenhower massive retaliation approach and so this seemed very topical at the time.

Chamberlain wrote this in his diary. March 12th, "Talked to Fontain [French official] emphasizing that public opinion would not support us in sanctions of any kind. His view is that if a firm front is maintained Germany will yield without war. We cannot accept this as a reliable estimate of a mad dictator's reaction." It was in fact, say, a reliable estimate. That much could be guessed. Minister Baldwin calculated his own critical risk at this juncture as precisely I said as if he had been reading these lectures.

"You may be right, he told Fontain, but if there is even one chance in a hundred that war would follow from your police operation I have not



the right to commit England." The mad dictator, they calculated was, at least, one percent likely to carry out his threat to fight if they fired on him. And that was enough to deter them. Later they were willing to take much higher risks. But the risks were higher because in fact as I said they had fortified the Rhineland, Hitler became more and more committed to confidence in his own judgment—especially after Munich. The generals were virtually enslaved to him because they were so wrong. They had been prepared to carry out a coup at the time of Munich rather than let him go ahead with what they saw as his mad provocation. They saw correctly at that time that the British and French were much closer to fighting—as they were. And so Hitler had to use still other tactics. But as he won each of these bets— gambles that he was making—he became more confident. They became totally unconfident. His gambler's instinct took full command of the apparatus. And they went on from gamble to gamble until they lost—heavily. So it was a dynamic to that which was not a random process in itself. It went... As he said, "I go as a sleepwalker from risk taking to risk taking." And he said to the Austrian Prime Minister Shushnig, two years later, "England will not move a finger for Austria." He had learned that, he felt. "And France? Well, two years ago we marched on the Rhineland with a handful of <sup>Battalions</sup> Italians. That was a time I risked everything. But now it is too late for France."

The Austrian situation, I want to mention, too, because it has interesting similarities to the NATO problem as does the Rhineland in a certain way. In all of these situations (including the Quemoy and the

others that I will be talking about) the defending power found itself with almost nothing to rely on in a given situation except a vast, enormous threat which it was very reluctant to invoke. And this gave bargaining power to the other side. The counteraction.

In the case of Austria, again Hitler's (by that time in 1938) power vis-a-vis Austria was now quite large, at least on paper or in machines. When he did in fact move unopposed into Austria as a result of successful blackmail 70 percent of the tanks and vehicles broke down on the way to Vienna. The road was simply clogged with broken down vehicles which would have been totally subject lets say to air attack by the British and French or the Austrians or the Czechs or the Italians if they had come in on that move. What had seemed to protect Austria was the likelihood that these powers would move if Hitler went in. Not that Austria could resist...

CHANGE TAPE SIDES

the others would get involved. That was also true in the case of Czechoslovakia. In fact Hitler feared that even Mussolini with whom he didn't have yet a clearcut alliance might well move if he went into Austria. In short the Austrian forces had this character of a trip wire or a plate glass window as our troops in NATO are sometimes called. The window that protects the jewelery store because to get in you have to heave a brick through it and make enough noise that you attract policemen.

That is not totally to be relied on. That is our NATO strategy. But there are in fact tactics to uncouple the burglar alarm, uncouple the

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trip wire, cut through the plate glass without making so much noise. I thought then and I would say today, to rely on such tactics of blowing the world up is a vulnerable, defensive, tactic. And I was worried then as I say that the Soviets might press these Hitlerian tactics any day. They weren't likely because of their weakness at that time. I am not one of those who's confident that the Soviets will remain as cautious as they have been forever—that they will forever remain as cautious as they have been in the 30 years of extreme inferiority. This goes on. So as I say I think the world is getting more dangerous.

Hitler's problem was to get Shushnig, the Chancellor of Austria, to invite him in so that there would be no fighting at all. That the plate glass window would make no noise. The trip wire would be uncoupled by the people involved. To do this he had to bring them in—Shushnig in by that time—face to face. A one percent chance was no longer enough.

Because what he was asking of Shushnig now was not just to go back on the treaty violation but to turn over his country to German control—a very big demand. And to do so without fighting.

Shushnig was invited by VonPoppen, the German Ambassador to Austria. He had suggested the visit to discuss such misunderstandings and points of friction as had persisted after the agreement of '36. He assured Shushnig to take the trip, that nothing very serious would be discussed, nothing to the disadvantage of the Austrian government, it would not entail any aggravation of Austro-German relations. "The worst that can happen, said VonPoppen, "is that after the meeting we are exactly where we are today. The Fuhrer told me so himself."



They arrived at the Berghoff, having gone in a Caterpillar tractor up an icy road past division after division of German troops, all perched on the Austrian frontier. Shushnig is met at the entrance to the Berghoff by Hitler with three generals next to him and they go to Hitler's study for the first conversation. Shushnig begins by thanking Hitler for the invitation. He comments on the scene from the picture window, "This room [this is Shushnig's diary, by the way which he wrote in prison later. Almost every year on the anniversary of this visit he wrote in his diary three years ago, five years ago, six years ago it all started. He said] This room with its wonderful view has doubtless been the scene of many a decisive conference, Herr Reichscancellor.

[Says Hitler] "Yes, in this room my thoughts ripen," Hitler replies and then he adjusts the tone of the conversation, "but we do not get together to speak of the fine view or the weather."

And then at this point the conversation becomes (as Shushnig notes in his diary) "somewhat unilateral."

"Within a few minutes Hitler's shouting is audible in the next room. He rages at the unworthiness, the worthlessness of Austria, its zero contribution to German culture."

[Shushnig asks] 'Beethoven?'

'A German,' [says Hitler].

'But he chose to live in Vienna,' [says Shushnig] 'And what of Maetternik?'

'That's as may be,' says Hitler and gets down to the business of the interview.

He says "'The whole history of Austria is one uninterrupted act of high treason and I tell you right now, Herr Shushnig, I am absolute and determined to make an end of all this. The German Reich is one of the great powers and nobody will raise his voice if it settles its border problems. I have a historic mission and this mission I will fulfill because Providence has destined me to do so. Who is not with me will be crushed.'

'Well what are your complaints?' [Shushnig asks] 'Austria wants only to live in peace.'

'That is what you say, Herr Shushnig, but I am telling you that I am going to solve the so-called Austrian problem one way or the other.'

It's a phrase that Nevil Chamberlain was to hear a bit later over Munich. Speaking then of the Sudatanland, Hitler said to Chamberlain, "I shall not put up with this any longer. I shall settle this question in one way or another. I shall take matters into my own hands," Hitler was to say then, speaking of Sudatanland. His interpreter, who had not been present at the Shushnig interview because Shushnig spoke German, comments on this phrase in writing of the scene with Chamberlain. "This is the first time in a discussion with a foreign statesman that the phrase in one way or another had been used. A phrase" says Schmidt, "which I observed then and later to be an extreme danger signal." This will come up later in our lecture. "I rightly translated it one way or another. but its meaning now and on later occasions amounted to either the other side gives in or a solution will be found by means of the application of force, invasion, or war."

So he complains that Austria is fortifying its border against the Reich. Shushnig says, well that's their right to do so. He says, "I have only to give an order," says Hitler, "and one single night all your ridiculous defense mechanisms are blown to bits. You don't seriously believe you can stop or even delay me for half an hour, do you?" Notice his own poor maintenance in fact stopped him on the road. "Perhaps you will wake up one morning in Vienna to find us there. Just like a spring storm. And then you'll see something. I would very much like to save Austria from such a fate because such an action would mean blood."

Shushnig replies, "I'm fully aware you can invade Austria. But Herr Reichschancellor, whether we like it or not, that would mean bloodshed. We are not alone in this world and such a step would probably mean war." This is true. Hitler's own generals were pointing this out. The likelihood of the mobilization.

Hitler says, "It's easy enough to talk of war while we are sitting here in our comfortable easy chairs. But war means endless misery for millions. Do you want to take this responsibility on yourself, Herr Shushnig? We shall hear this refrain again and again from Hitler. "Yours is the choice," he tells Benish, Hokke, France, England. "My decision is made. It is irrevocable. I will march. It is for you to decide to commence or not a second world war. Think well, is that what you want?" He screams at Nuremburg seven months later, "I have made Herr Benish an offer. The decision now lies in his hands. Peace or war. Now let Herr Benish make his choice."

The problem briefly that I discussed before where the victim faces let's say a demand which I'll call accept or resist—the possibility of



resisting. The blackmailer makes a threat—a demand—and has also two strategies in this simplified form. And let me just suggestively without justifying (we're going to have a brake in a minute—a few minutes—10 minutes?) suggestively let's call this the status quo or just labeled zero. I'm using for those of you who raised your hands last time Von Noiman and Morgenstern utilities. I won't explain it. I think intuitively those of you who don't know what that means will get the gist of this. The numbers are meant only to suggest the relative order of preference of people for the outcomes and a sense of the degree of preference. And the degree of preference I will define operationally in just a minute.

So if he accepts the demand, it's worse than that then compared. The particular threats I'm looking at have the peculiar character of being catastrophic if the threat is carried out by the blackmailer. If you resist and I carry out my threat (I'm the blackmailer) you get very much worse than this. And what I mean by assigning a number like that is precisely what I said earlier. You won't risk very much of this to make you comply compared to this. It's very much worse. It doesn't need very much of a risk to make you do it. But the problem now is if we put in the blackmailer's payoff to the left here—my payoff—this is what I want, let's say... I'm sorry. This is what I want here. Call this zero, this is my status quo. But if I carry out the threat it's also I could say minus 2,000. I'm not comparing these numbers. The numbers only apply to the particular person. The ones on the left are the blackmailer's the ones on the right... If you don't follow this don't


worry about it. It's only quickly to be suggestive to those of you who do follow it. And you can read my lectures if you want some more.

The point here then is it is very difficult for me to make it even slightly plausible because if I carry out the threat it's catastrophic for me. As it was if Hitler had been confronted with resistance in Austria or the Rhineland or for that matter Munich. And as it turned out to be when he went into Russia. In this case you don't have to be very sure in order to accept this—bad as it is. This is worse than this, but to avoid this, even a small probability of it, will make you accept. OK.

The problem then of the blackmailer is to make you believe that there is at least... Actually this can be computed. If these were VonNoiman Morgenstern utilities—meaning that they really tell you what kind of bets the person will take (for those of you who know what that means). The critical risk here would be in fact 10 over 1,000. So in fact a one percent chance. What these numbers say is that a one percent chance of this outcome will make the victim take this. OK? But again just think of that. And again if one thinks of one percent chance as a kind of precision that doesn't have anything to do with real situations. Recall my example, not chosen at random. If there is one chance in a hundred that Hitler is not bluffing in the Rhineland says Fontain, I cannot take the choice.

So statesmen do make choices like that. One finds it all the time. Kennedy gave an interesting estimate at the time of the Cuban missile crisis that the chance of general war which he was threatening if the Soviets did not back down was between one third and one half. Not a

precise estimate, but a range. It so happens my Ph.D. thesis was on the use of ranges of probabilities to suggest uncertainties so I particularly like that example. OK.

One thing you can do then is to somehow take this alternative of not carrying out the threat—failing to carry out the threat—out of the play. Make it impossible. Somehow make it so that I can't carry it out. That's what you try to convey then as I say. That's what the blackmailer like Hitler here tried to convey. This doesn't apply. It's impossible. I am committed. Your choice is between this and this. Make your choice. That's what he said. 

The other way is implying... another way to do this is to suggest to the victim that some of these outcomes are not correctly estimated. I don't mind war. I think I will win. This is not minus 2,000 for me, it's minus 2. Nothing much. I want war, and so forth. Hard to do with thermonuclear war. That's a problem.

Another one is to say, "If I fail to carry out the threat that's not a status quo. I have staked my honor on it—my credibility—and I don't bluff. If I'm caught bluffing... It was quite true. If Hitler had been caught bluffing his career would have been over. Quite possible his life would have been over. But certainly his project would have been over. No more bluffs. So what he's saying here is then he is deliberately pointing out that this (in effect by staking his honor) he is saying that this outcome is less than it appears. Let's say that it is worse than death, worse than destruction. It's minus 3,000. I have to carry it out. Again with thermonuclear war, hard to do. And hard for Hitler to make. But Hitler's peculiar characteristics played a role there.



Another whole way (there are various aspects of doing this) is to say, "I have delegated this decision to someone else who is merely carrying out his job. It is automatic." Like the automated picture taking. The teller can't, ~~light~~ the signs on vending cars, let's say. "This truck has only five dollars with it on a taxi window." I can only make \$10 change. I don't have it. You can't break it from me I am forced to keep emptying my cash box. So it's out of my hands, no use threatening me. I just don't have it to give. There are various other ways. Delegating it to someone else—showing that you yourself if you are the victim—are under superior orders and you cannot, you know...

Butch Cassidy? How many have seen Butch Cassidy? Great movie. Just occurs to me. I just showed it to my six-year-old. You know the scene where the man says, "I work for E.H. Harrison, Butch, I'd love to give you the money, but I work for Mr. E.H. Harrison and I cannot open this door." Remember this? "C'mon, man, don't be a hero." And they do have to blast it in. All these methods.

The point of this little diagram is just to distinguish various tactics that can be done. Forinstance, to make the critical risk lower, one could say—the risk that I have to meet, the probability—to make you more likely to give in (you, the victim, to give in) I could raise this outcome. I could lower this outcome. I could lower this outcome for you. Any of those would make you more likely to give in. Or I can change them in more complicated ways that have effects on your relations between those. I can increase this outcome for myself. Make it look higher. I can make this look higher. I can make this look as I say, lower.

These are all a great variety of tactics that can be used which have essentially the same effect—to lower your resistance to this threat. And I can do various things that make it look likely that I will carry out the threat. One of them is simply to appear erratic or ideologically committed. This would be worse than death, worse than giving up. Tremendous consequences. That has the key effect of lowering this payoff so as to change your expectations of what I am going to do. OK? I'll finish this example.

"After the army," says Hitler, "how to make it credible that it would mean a lot of blood."

Shushnig says, "It will make blood."

*Galvin*  
"After the army," says Hitler, "my S.A. and the Austrian Legion would move in and nobody can stop their just revenge, not even I." OK? If you resist and I go in, this is what you'll get. Not because. This is much worse, let's say. Let's say this is occupation. Hitler says, it ain't just occupation. The S.A., the Legion will be out of my hands. If they lose casualties.

Henry V said the same before Harfleur as a matter of fact. Give up if you've seen Henry V. He says give up or I will not be able to stop my troops' blood lust. If you want to see your grandparents raped, your women raped, your children raped, put to the sword, says Henry V, then resist, otherwise give in. Same problem basically here.

So he's saying it's not minus 1,000, it's 2,000. We'll wipe you out and I won't be able to control it. "Do you want to make another Spain of Austria? I should like to avoid all that if possible." Spain, a civil

war. The Austrian Legion will carry out a vengeance which I personally would have no interest in doing but that civil passion will lead to it.

"Think it over Herr Shushnig, think it over well. I tell you that. You will do well to take my words literally. I can only wait until this afternoon. I don't believe in bluffing. All my past is proof of that." This a year or so after the Rhineland. "I have achieved everything that I set out to do and thus have become perhaps the greatest German of all history." And if you deprive me of that I won't be the greatest German of all history. I'll be like Beethoven or somebody who chose to live in Austria. Or Maetternik. Henry Kissinger wrote his thesis on Maetternik.

"What exactly are your wishes?" Shushnig asked finally.

"That we can discuss this afternoon," says Hitler. "It's time for lunch.

"At the dinner table, surrounded by his generals, Hitler talked of cars, houses, architecture, he seemed," says Shushnig, "in excellent spirits." Afterwards the Austrians were left to talk with the generals and for the first time Shushnig, a heavy chain smoker, was allowed to light a cigarette and at last they were presented with the list of demands which essentially were to end the independence of Austria.

Shushnig says, "I could not possibly do this. In fact, I can't control this. Niklus, the President of Austria is the only one who could give in to these demands. I can't do it."

Hitler says you'd better find a way in effect. "You have to guarantee that," says Hitler.

"I could not possibly, Herr Reichscancellor."



"At this answer," says Shushnig, "Hitler seemed to lose his self control. He ran to the doors, opened them and shouted, 'General Keitel!' Turning back to me he said, 'I shall have you called later.'" In the antechamber Shushnig talks to his aide who tells him he'd been talking to Keitel—General Keitel. When Hitler called for him Keitel had changed his tone instantly he says to Shushnig, "I would not be surprised if we are both arrested in the next five minutes."

In fact what Hitler wanted to discuss with Keitel was, as Yodel recorded in his diary. "The Fuhrer's order is to be effective military pressure. Shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th." The next day he added, "The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." But the German military attaché saw rolling stock assembled, maneuvers held, but actually the minutes that Schmidt and Shushnig sat waiting to be arrested were as effective as any of this charade.

And in the end Hitler called Shushnig in and said, "I have decided to change my mind for the first time in my entire life. But I warn you this is your very last chance. I have given you three days before the agreement goes into effect." And seven months later after placating Chamberlain by extending his ultimatum to Czechoslovakia by three days he flattered the prime minister with the statement, "You are the only man to whom I have ever made a concession." Which was a white lie at that point. At any rate Shushnig agreed to sign and they then began to chat very friendly.

Hitler says, "I would gladly spare the world another war," Hitler remarks, "But I don't know whether it can be avoided if no one believes me." He turns to VonPoppen (one little note here) and says, "In the decisive hour of 1933 you saved the Reich from chaos by making it possible that the control be placed in my hands."

"Indeed, my Fuhrer," says VonPoppen

"I shall never forget it, Herr VonPoppen. And in fact Hitler had been thinking of VonPoppen just recently. He had been planning, we now know from the Nurenburg document, he had been planning to manufacture a pretext for the Austrian Legion in Germany to march into Austria to put down the red menace. This was his plan a week earlier. And the provocation he had in mind was to assassinate VonPoppen. And VonPoppen had found this out and tipped the Austrian police off to the conspirators and then they had to bring Shushnig in and make the threats to him.

So finally Shushnig signed and on the way back to Salzburg VonPoppen was in good spirits. "Well now you've see what the Fuhrer can be like at times," he said, "but the next time I am sure it will be different. You know the Fuhrer can be absolutely charming." And Shushnig was thinking to himself it's in this diary, the next time...

The story goes on not funnily. He does march into Austria. He does march into Czechoslovakia in very similar terms. Sheirer who watched the speech threatening Czechoslovakia says, "He seemed tonight to have completely lost control of himself." William Sheirer who wrote Berlin Diary. And the next day when Hitler talked to the ambassador he shouted several times... he shouted, "Ich verde de ????? schlagen!" Which

Schmidt translated as faithfully as "I will smash the Czechs!" And Hitler paced in one of the transports of rage that had earned him the name of tepitfesser, rug-eater, among his subordinates. The word that Sheirer reports is that Hitler, in these transports, would fall to the floor. When he was alone, not in front of foreign diplomats, and chew the rug in rage. Tepitfesser.

Berserk  
Shit-eater  
Rug-eater

When Wilson warned that if France should become involved in hostilities against Germany the United Kingdom would support France. "That means," said Hitler, "that if France chooses to attack Germany, England feels it her duty to attack Germany also." Wilson protested. Hitler shouted him down. "If France and England strike, let them do so. It is a matter of complete indifference to me." Same same here. I don't care, you do it. He says, "It is a matter of complete indifference to me. It is Tuesday today and by next Monday we shall all be at war."

War was not however a matter of complete indifference to his opponents. It is hard for that to call them mad. It was their weakness. Their vulnerability in bargaining with a man who wanted war. Chamberlain's willingness to risk conflict here was less than absolute. But he was not mad for that.

I made the comment in 1958 as I looked at threats by Khrushchev that "Our missiles will fly automatically if you go into Berlin." Intercontinental missiles that did not exist when he said that. "Our missiles will fly automatically" and his generals echoed the words in front of the American official, "automatically."

I was interested that what had led to that was that Hitler had been forced to back down in May of 1938 and had been driven almost and



generally half crazy by it. His interpreter says, "The world press announced jubilantly that the German dictator had yielded. One had only to stand up to him as the Czechs had done. They said to make him see reason." May of '38. Anyone deliberately planning to madden Hitler could have thought of no better method. Openly to accuse a dictator of weakness is the thing least likely to make him see reason. Or as the English ambassador said, "If there is one thing which a dictator dislikes it is being dictated to."

I find that I wrote at that time, it will be interesting to read in the history some day how Mao Tse Tung and Khrushchev enjoyed being forced to back down at Quemoy and Berlin. In theory, of course, you can't insult a Communist. If that is so, which we may hope, the Berliners may not learn the Russian for seschlagen. Take a break of about ten minutes.

The Russians talk a good deal about Munich. It is not only the Americans and the British who learned a lesson of appeasement. In fact a lesson drawn at Munich... it is there to be drawn where the costs to the world of regarding in 1938 giving in to Hitler as a lesser evil than an alliance with a communist state—the Soviet Union—which was offering one at that time and which could have prevented the takeover of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets have, as I've said, have in fact learned lessons not only from that period which they have occasion to refer to from time to time in our negotiations. the Vietnamese, too, talked of Munich and of appeasement at various points in their negotiations with us.

The fact is that after the Cuban missile crisis which we'll be discussing later in the course, which came after these lectures of mine

JFK and thus after Quemoy, after Berlin, as I mentioned last time, a Soviet official said to an American official in the immediate aftermath, "You will never be able to do this to us again." And the price of the success was not that we have yet learned Russian for seschlagen, yet, fortunately. But that Khrushchev lost his job having been caught bluffing once too often and was replaced by a man—Brezhnev, who set out to give the Russian military the wherewithall that they would not have to back down again in places like Syria or Lebanon again. I hope they back down when they are put to the test. I am not certain that they will and that is why I think that this course is discussing this subject at a moment when it could not be more ominously relevant in terms of the risk.

How many have read any of the Quemoy material already? I hadn't given page numbers yet. How many have not? OK. The Chinese did back down in Quemoy, over the Quemoy crisis that we will discuss. And indeed the lesson drawn from that by a current American politician writing in 1968, Ronald Reagan, was this. "Go back a few years and recall another time of crisis. This time the Red Chinese were threatening to invade the offshore islands in Formosa. The world tensed and we heard the familiar terror talk that any action of any kind would bring on World War III. And then another voice [this was Reagan in a book that he wrote in 1968] ...then another voice was heard speaking in a tone we have not heard for too long a time in this land of ours. Dwight David Eisenhower said 'They'll have to crawl over the 7th Fleet to do it.' The invasion of Formosa did not take place. No young men died. And World War III did not follow." That was in '68.

In 1980, twelve years later, running for office, I have a clipping from a reporter following Reagan around stating that this passage or this effect was his most widely used comment on foreign policy. That the way he would chose to conduct foreign policy in confrontations with the Soviets was a rather obscure historical analogy—was the way Eisenhower had blocked the Chinese from taking the Island of Quemoy. I suspect not too many people understood entirely what he was saying when he said that because the history of the Quemoy Crisis has been and remains top secret to a large extent until now, until it's been put on reserve here. In Mort Halperin's study.

So whether Reagan knew entirely what he was saying, I don't know, but I suspect he did. It would be well for us to know at any rate what he was talking about and thus the relevance of history. As I said, though, just to complete the last section, the Chinese did back down in the face of our stand at Quemoy as they did in a number of other cases—in Korea, in Kaison later, various other cases. Berlin in 1961, in Cuba in 1962, and for reasons that may have been related to what Chamberlain saw at Munich. They think of it as backing down—as appeasement. But the reasons for appeasement have to be understood. Chamberlain thought he was not ready for war. In fact the British air force was far stronger than the German. Churchill in saying the opposite was mistaken. But not many people knew that then. The English air force was actually stronger. In part Churchill and his air force sources... In order to mobilize British taxpayers and Parliament to support still larger bombing forces, took in every case the upper estimates of German fighter, air



force strength, tank strength in other words. Greatly exaggerated.

83 Underestimated the English position. Implied that Germany was superior—which it was not, in order to scare the British into paying for still larger forces. And it's partly a result of that Chamberlain was led to believe that in that confrontation he had little choice but to back down.

A commentator on Chamberlain, speaking of Chamberlain flying back from his first visit with Hitler. His first airplane trip over the channel. "I remember him saying after he had flown back from Germany, that as he saw spread out like a map beneath him in the mile upon mile of flimsy houses which constituted the east end of London, he could not bear to think of their inmates lying a prey to bombardment from the air." I quoted to those of you who remained last time some notes from Chamberlain's letters to his relatives and to his diary. "With such an extraordinary creature," he said, referring to Hitler, "one can only speculate is it not positively horrible to think that the fate of hundreds of millions depends on one man and he is half mad." And this led him to the flight to Bertesgarten and to the acceptance of Hitler's demands. He said, "I cannot let the decision as to peace or war pass out of our hands into those of a ruler of another country. And a lunatic at that." And so in short, Hitler's reputation for madness served him very well.

One point that I didn't bring out adequately I think before was that Hitler was very conscious of exploiting this reputation. After his first meeting with Chamberlain, VonVeitsecker, his Secretary of State reports,

"Hitler gave a lively and joyful description of the conversation to Ribbentrop and myself. He clapped his hands as after a highly successful entertainment. He felt he had been able to maneuver the dry civilian into a corner." After another such meeting he said, "The British cabinet [after eating the carpet in effect, climbing the walls and he said as soon as the British had left the room] "The British Cabinet will not last another day after that," he said. As I said at one point in here, Hitler, if he had not been Hitler, he would have invented Hitler. He had a good theory of what it took in his circumstances.

One more example from that period is relevant to some of the examples I am talking about. Very briefly. I just want to make one point here. He wanted to turn off the burglar alarm represented by the Czech defenses which now are rather comparable to NATO defenses as of now. They were not minor. They were not scarecrow like Austria's defenses. They were as massive an army as existed in Europe. Forty extremely well armed modern well disciplined divisions with extremely strong fortification. In the end when the Germans did march in past those fortifications the general's response was we could not have gotten through these. And had the war in fact started earlier, no one knows exactly it would have gone but two things are knowable. One is that Hitler would have been confronting not only these heavy fortifications in Czechoslovakia which in the event he was able to walk past because of the allies backing down and would have had then to fight the forty Czech divisions. So in the end when he was attacking Poland, when he was attacking Russia, he did not have the Czech divisions to worry about. The balance had been strongly changed.

This was not an easy one to make the British and French back down and I'm now talking of a situation after Munich when he walked into the west of Czechoslovakia, having gotten half of it at Munich. It was essential again that there be no resistance whatever because if there were the threat that the Czechs posed was the threat of a process that was uncontrollable and would almost surely have brought the British and French in at that time.

The other point was that the British and French understood very well that they were likely to win in the end. The French overestimated their abilities obviously. But the British did not believe nor did the German, that they were bound to be defeated by the Germans. Quite the contrary. They expected to win in the end. And Goehring, the Air Force Commander, did not really say to the contrary to the British. What he said was, "No one can say where it will lead if it comes to war. But one thing is certain. Very many Britishers will die." And that was true. And that was the threat being posed. It was basically not a threat of sure victory at that point. It was a threat that they were committed enough (and they were) that if there had been resistance the process could go out of control. That is the nature of a nuclear threat, essentially.

So again, whether the threat is wielded by the U.S. or by the Soviets, whether it is a bluff or not, that is basically the threat being made. Again the tactics were to try to assure that there be no response at all by exaggerating the superiority and by bringing the blackmail to bear very closely. In a private conference the President of Czechoslovakia who had just been made president. A very aging man, sick



was brought I should say hours before the invasion, to insure that there should be no Czech resistance at all.

He came with his daughter, he was met with a bouquet of flowers for the daughter and chocolates. The usual routine. He was brought in to see Hitler late at night, inside a room, not knowing what he is to expect. And again they inform him that there is no choice before him. Nor did Hitler have any choice. The invasion would begin in 5 hours. There were said Hitler two possibilities. The first was the invasion of the German troops might develop into a battle. This would be broken down by force of arms with all available means. The other was that the entry of the German troops would take place in a peaceable manner and then Czechoslovakia would be given some autonomy. If it came to fighting then the bloodshed would compel us to hate also, said Hitler. So this invitation to quit was the last good deed he would be able to render to the Czech people. But <sup>Hoch</sup>Hokke could avert the worst.

At six o'clock, said Hitler, the troops would march in. He felt almost ashamed to say that for every Czech batallion, a German division would come. The military operation was not a trifling one but had been planned on a most generous scale. What he was asking of Hokke was that Hokke phone Prague and order the troops to lay down their arms and welcome the Germans in. Hokke refused at first. He was pursued around the table by Germans including Goehring, thrusting the documents before the Czechs and pressing pens into their hands shouting, "Sign! If you refuse half Prague will lie in ruins from aerial bombardment within two hours."

"I have nothing at all against your beautiful city," said Goehring to Hokke, "However, if you want to do anything at all against the decision of the fuhrer, especially if you should attempt to get help from the West, then I shall be forced to show the world the 100 percent effectiveness of my air force."

I might mention, again this is in response to some comments I have gotten from students, that I seem to be emphasizing the British responsibility for strategic bombardment and indeed it's true that the British and Americans, unlike the Germans had developed a doctrine that strategic bombardment of cities was the way to win a war. Only the British and Americans had developed long range bombers that could carry heavy bomb loads and really do a job. And even they were quite inadequate in early years of the war.

It turned out that it took years to develop a force that could really do entirely what Goehring was threatening here. The Germans on the contrary did not think that it was the way to fight a war and had not developed the planes for it. But I think I over exaggerated that point in my earlier lectures. Because thinking about it the point to be made here is that Hitler, a theorist of blackmail, did not have the mistaken theory of the British and Americans that bombardment of cities would actually win a war.

But he did have a very strong theory of what a threat could do. And he used it again and a again. He used even combat operations—that is against military targets—to look like massacre operations. Movies were shown of planes that were actually dropping bombs on military targets in

the suburbs of Warsaw but the world was given the impression that they were watching Warsaw being wiped out. Hitler chose that impression.

Likewise he chose not to reveal that the destruction of Rotterdam had been something of an error. He let people be scared by it. He was bluffing in effect.

But these bluffs, these threats have a way of increasing the likelihood that the experience comes about. Having threatened so long that he would destroy London. Something that he did not actually believe in doing. And having, however, built an air force which could be used for that, although not optimally, not very efficiently, when he was frustrated in his attempt to invade Britain he found himself going for something for which no planning had been made—sending the bombers against the heart of London.

Some years into this war in Iraq and Iran this week, the missiles are being turned on the houses, the housing, the civilians on both sides. And the war may last long enough if this arms race continues for one or both of them to acquire nuclear weapons. Abraham Maslow the psychologist once said that if your only instrument is a hammer, everything begins to look to you like a nail. There is another slogan that is meaningful to me as the father of a six-year-old—give a little boy a hammer and he will find something that needs hammering. Give these countries strategic bombers and they find uses of them in wars for which those bombers were not designed.

I told either this class or my seminar, I forget which, my feeling in the Pentagon in 1965 when I discovered that the B-52, a weapon that was



designed for no other purpose than to deliver a one way trip, well a two way trip, but a single mission of a thermonuclear weapon was turned to delivering 750 pound bombs on Viet Nam because we had the B-52s and we were not winning the war without them. Another factor that I think comes to bear on the dangers of continuing this arms race.

Anyway so I'm saying, Hitler's threats.... Let me then reverse any impression I gave that Hitler was not responsible for what happened to him in the way of bombing. The threats he made in Warsaw, Rotterdam, Belgrade and in Prague—against Prague were virtually a direct legitimization of the British operations that had long been planned against Germany.

#### CHANGE TAPES

questions you know. If we could get such measures used against them no matter what they did so they went ahead and bombed Berlin before Hitler had bombed England. On the assumption that Hitler would bomb England sooner or later. A self-confirming prophecy to a considerable extent. The bombing of London came after six heavy raids on Berlin and after warnings by Hitler that he would bomb London in retaliation with the hammer that Goehring had provided him.

In any case though they were trying to get Hocke (??) to get his forces to drop, to stop—surrender overnight. He'd allowed only hours. And in the midst of this two things happened. Hocke fainted at one point. He was old, fainted and had to be revived with injections by

Hitler's doctor who was big on amphetamines and cocaine. (As was John F. Kennedy's doctor it turns out.) "Hocke was revived by Morel with injections. He fainted again, was revived again. In the midst of this they were trying to get Prague so Hocke could phone Prague and tell them to lay down their arms. At this moment the telephone line to Prague was out of order."

Schmidt the interpreter, who is writing this in his memoirs, says "A nervy Ribbentrop told me to find out who's gone and let us down." All Schmidt could find out was that Prague did not answer. "Ribbentrop screamed, scarlet with rage, 'Call the Postmaster General at once and for me personally,'" speaking about ministers who were sleeping while they were all hard at work. "I redoubled my efforts with the knowledge that failure to get through might cost many lives."

If Hocke had fainted once too often, if the line had not gotten open to Prague, the Czech 40 divisions would have resisted. WW II would have started then and it would have gone very differently in fact. And Hitler was taking that risk. He was not at all certain to succeed. As I said, his generals, impressed with the risks of all this, had been ready at the time of Munich, months earlier, to make a coup. The coup was forestalled, whether they would have done it is another question, but they were planning it, and their plans were forestalled when they got the message that Chamberlain was ready to talk—to come to Berchesgarten. This time they were not planning a coup. Hitler had been right too often. But he came close to being wrong and a telephone line had something to do with it.

A final comment on Hitler. He was an unusual opponent. Hitler threatened war, but these statesmen who were not mad did not disguise the fact that they feared war, they would pay to avoid violence and risk.

That's not unusual. "War is a fearful thing," said Chamberlain, "We must be sure that it is really the great issues that are at stake." To Hitler violence and war were values, not costs. They were preferred means and more than that, virtually ends in themselves. More than to his unprepared opponents, war to him meant victory. But even without victory it meant the test and demonstration of strength, of daring, manhood, racial and national superiority. There was not substitute for war. To Roushning he said in 1932, "None of these people want any longer war and greatness, but I want war."

On the diagram, then, this was better than turning it down. That was the man we were confronting. "I go the way providence dictates with the assurance of a sleepwalker," said Hitler, proclaiming the triumph of his gamble in the Rhineland from which his own generals had failed to deter him. Erratic, unpredictable, totally bound by convention, honor, morality, he confronted his opponents who wanted nothing badly with intense obsessive wants. He found the status quo they offered him unbearable. To be not merely broken but revenged.

For 38 years United States policy has been based publicly and rhetorically (and to a considerable extent, privately) on the assumption that we are facing Hitler as an opponent—which is to say, a man or a government (Soviet Union) determined to use methods such as these at the first available moment. Undeterrable except by overwhelming strength or



superiority, and quite specifically—not to be negotiated with. As I've said earlier, I am not one of those who believes that Hitler will never face us—there will never be a Hitler confronting this country. And a Hitler—like leadership with Russian weapons would in fact be extremely fearsome at this point. OR US!

When I wrote these lectures in 1959, after a summer at the Rand Corporation, I was impressed with the possibility that we were being told at that time that we were confronting the reincarnation of Hitler (which is the central premise of the cold war and not without plausibility, especially in the Stalin period, but even later when Khrushchev was talking about the threats he was making). I said at that time, in March of 1959, "There is indeed nothing to be learned from the experience of the '30s unless we make the mental effort to seek out the transformations in the data—to decide which changes are relevant—and somehow to allow for them." But the effort is worth making. If Hitler was mad, his theory was not. "The difference between Munich and now," Khrushchev said recently, (March of '59 as I wrote this) "is that I am not Adolph Hitler." I noted he didn't feel a need to distinguish himself from Chamberlain.

What Hitler was, no man, we must hope, aspires to be. But what Hitler knew, others can learn and use and win with it until they fail and smash all humankind.

Two things were not in my mind as I joined the Pentagon, as I joined the Rand Corporation at that time. One was the extent to which the risks—the dangers of overestimating—of exaggerating the likelihood that

one is confronting—literally—Hitler; dangers of assuming that  
negotiation cannot possibly achieve anything. In 1959, a year when I  
assumed that the Soviets had (were on the verge of having) 100  
missiles—would have them by the next year—would have perhaps thousands  
by early '62—more than we had... On the assumption (which was the  
official estimating intelligence assumption of the United States) a  
Russian capability to produce those weapons would surely be exploited,  
since that is what Hitler would have done... In fact... And therefore  
there was no point in testing whether Khrushchev was serious in offering  
then a comprehensive test ban, as he did offer. Surely he couldn't want  
such a thing. Surely he was going hell-bent for the kind of capability  
that Hitler would have given his arm to have during the war. ✓

In fact, Khrushchev not only had no missiles, he was not building any  
at that time. Which means he was bluffing. In that respect not entirely  
unlike Hitler at the time of the Rhineland. That is not a reassuring  
memory. On the other hand the light that that draws on the possibility  
of agreeing with Khrushchev is rather brilliant. And I've never really  
seen any discussion of it ever since, in the almost 25 years since then. ✓ ?

I recently asked McGeorge Bundy, as a matter of fact, the following  
question: When the new estimate came out, three years after Khrushchev  
had proposed the test ban to us—a comprehensive test ban—which we had  
refused (although Eisenhower was interested in it)... When we had the  
estimate that they had exactly four missiles that were almost surely  
unreliable we in fact (as McGeorge Bundy knew) proceeded with a program  
of building what came to be 1,000 Minutemen missiles. And I asked him,

could he recall any consideration whatever in the light of this new estimate of taking a new look at the possibility of a test ban. A test ban offered by the Soviets at that time would have kept the Soviets if not at four missiles in '61, at dozens... maybe a hundred. Not the 14 hundred they have now with thousands of warheads.

*Handwritten:* He thought that was a good question. He said the question had never occurred to him. He had never thought about it. And as best as he could remember, no one in the White House thought for a moment about reconsidering our negotiating posture at that time. It can hardly... *note*

One can't prove what Khrushchev would have done under those circumstances. But certainly the assumptions that he could not have been serious in wanting a test ban (which would have kept <sup>him</sup> us from having the missiles which he was foregoing anyway without a test ban) has to be taken a good deal more seriously as a possibility. In short the simple, sincere, unquestioned assumption in the Pentagon and the White House that we were reliving the Hitler experience in this unnegotiability was extremely costly in 1958, and '59 and '61 and '63 and '68 and all the other times to this day that we have refused a test ban.

Maybe they have learned lessons that make them more Hitler-like this year or next year. Who knows who will succeed Andropov. If a Hitler comes to power (and by Hitler I mean above all a reckless gambler—a desperate man believing in his own <sup>faith</sup> faith, willing to expand or to get out of tight situations at any cost, at any gamble—he'll be a lot better armed than Khrushchev ever was because of that generation-old image that was very convenient for the United States—that we were fighting Hitler. ✓?



The fact is that what we learned (as I suggested in my second lecture here) was the convenience of having an enemy like Hitler, because it permitted you to do anything. To fight an enemy as powerful as Hitler—as ominous and sinister as Hitler, as willing to do anything, to break all rules, to break all morality—freed us, we learned, to use destructive power on anybody—to any extent, whatever. To learn, in engineering terms—in economic terms—how to destroy societies (including infants that had not been born when Hitler came to power and were not really very responsible for anything that he had done).

We learned that that was all right, not just as an accident, but as a deliberate way of making war. We learned that massacre was an acceptable instrument of policy because the world could contain a person who would use it against you and could be defeated, we <sup>OK</sup> thought, by no other means.

I said Hitler had a theory that would have led him to invent the persona of Hitler if he had not been Hitler. But we found that it was so convenient—so euphoric almost—to feel our power freed by Hitler as an enemy, that, lacking Hitler after 1945, we did invent Hitler. Fairly plausible against Stalin, but Stalin died in 1953. Not really very plausibly since then in terms of who we are fighting. And the risks of self-confirming prophecies in this field eventually as I say, are extremely serious.

I want to talk about Quemoy a little bit and about Viet Nam a little, and about both in '65 and under Nixon. I think I'll quote something briefly—very quickly—from my era in the Pentagon to make clear that again... just as Nixon is not the only problem either. I'll talk

about... I'll quote you something that remains top secret—"no dis"—that means no distribution to anybody, to this day. I think I can—should be—able to get away with this because this was made public in my trial by the government. They put it in my case against me so it's in the courthouse in Los Angeles. But it remains top secret—it's never been declassified—although any reporter can go see it in the records.

It's from a volume that I chose not to make public when I gave the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times. Forty—three volumes... forty—seven volumes I guess altogether. I put out forty—three volumes, four volumes of negotiation data I did not put out, I gave only to Fulbright because I didn't want to interfere with negotiations in putting out negotiation data. I thought it could be charged as interfering with negotiations (even though I didn't think it would). So I didn't put it out. The government chose to put it into the record as I say in the course of my trial. And having given it to Fulbright some years before (a couple of years before) I hadn't read it for a long time. I was just rereading it the other day.

Here is the... In 1964 when I had just joined the Pentagon I was aware of a super secret at that time which was that the Canadian member of the International Control Commission in Laos and Indo China, a man named Seaborne, had been used as a channel for what amounted to an ultimatum from Lyndon Johnson with the approval of the Canadian Government. I was aware that Seaborne was saying, as the record shows here, that if the conflict should escalate (this was June of '64 before the Tonkin Gulf incident if that means anything to you—before we had

launched any attacks on North Viet Nam) "The greatest devastation would, of course, result for the DRV itself," (that is the Hanoi regime itself).

He was threatening quite specifically aerial escalation. Now that was a summer in which Lyndon Johnson's opponent, Goldwater (an Air Force Major General Reserve and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee) was claiming that the United States should bomb North Viet Nam, bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail, bomb North Viet Nam itself, and even use nuclear weapons if necessary. And he thought it would be useful. Among other things he suggested that small nuclear weapons inner bursts would be good for defoliating the trees on the Ho Chi Minh trail. You had this problem, you couldn't see through the foliage and he thought nuclear weapons would be good at stripping the trees, among other things. Which conveyed a sense of light heartedness somehow about nuclear weapons to the American public and gave rise to the major theme of the campaign, which was that he was not to be trusted with his finger on the nuclear button. Something I'm going to come back to in just a second.

After the Tonkin Gulf reprisal (so-called, against an attack that did not take place against our destroyer) in August Seaborne went back and told Pham Van Dong "Those 64 sorties against your bases are an example of what awaits you. This is what I meant in June." So he was conveying very precise threats. Something that I did not know at the time in the Pentagon was this exchange involving our Ambassador in Viet Nam, Lodge, (whom I later served in Viet Nam) whose comment on the Seaborne proposals which I did not know in detail, I did not know the proposals in detail, was this in May of '64 before Seaborne went to Hanoi.



This is Lodge to his president, Lyndon Johnson. This has never been put out. "I much prefer selective use of Vietnamese airpower to an overt U.S. effort..." (Vietnamese air power which we had supplied to the Vietnamese) "...to an overt U.S. effort perhaps involving the total annihilation of all that has been built in North Viet Nam since 1954, because this would surely bring in the Chinese Communists and might well bring in the Russians." He's giving reasons for not totally annihilating the North Vietnamese. "Moreover," Lodge says, "if you lay the whole country waste, it is quite likely that you will induce a note of fatalism in the Viet Cong. Also there will be nobody left in North Viet Nam on whom to put pressure. Furthermore, South Viet Nam's infrastructure might well be destroyed," (that is in retaliation).

What we are interested in here is not destroying Ho Chi Minh as his successor would probably be worse than he is, but getting him to change his behavior. That is what Kennedy was trying to do in October with Sien<sup>Diem</sup> and with considerable success until Sien died of our efforts in November.

"It is easy for us on the one hand," says Lodge, "to ignore our superiority as we did at the time of Berlin in '48 when we still had sole possession of the atomic bomb. It is also a relatively simple concept to go out and destroy North Viet Nam. What is complicated but really effective, is to bring out power to bear in a precise way so as to specific results." Another advantage of this procedure is that if the time ever came that our military activities against the North ever became overt," (he's arguing for selective strikes by our Vietnamese—mercenaries in effect) "we would be in a strong moral position with

regard to U.S. public opinion, the U.S. Congress and U.N. I say this because we would then have had a record to show that we had given Ho Chi Minh fair warning to stop his murderous interference in the internal affairs of Viet Nam."

It might be worth mentioning to those of you who don't recall Viet Nam very well which is nearly all of you I suppose, that the constitutions of both South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam read "Viet Nam is one." And none of the puppets or various people that we backed in South Viet Nam was willing to say what Rusk said throughout the war that Viet Nam, South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam were separate independent sovereign countries and that what we wanted was for North Viet Nam to stop aggressing against its neighbor. These were words that no Vietnamese that we supported could bring himself to say because he would have been put out of office instantly. Both leaderships in Viet Nam, ours and the Vietnamese in Hanoi, agreed that there was one country of Viet Nam and it was impossible to think of Ho Chi Minh interfering in the internal affairs of Viet Nam. He was in Viet Nam where he lived as were other people.

As I say, I didn't know in joining the Pentagon that the threats Seaborne was making had sounded to Lodge quite as large as that, in fact. And I can only conjecture what my reaction would have been. My conjecture is that I would have wanted to know exactly what Seaborne had said and what was in mind. Here is one other suggestion of that again that has never been released publicly till now.

The President and McGeorge Bundy met May 28th in New York with Canadian Prime Minister Pearson. This is again before Seaborne arrived.

The President told Pearson that he wishes Hanoi to know that, while he is a man of peace, he does not intend to permit the North Vietnamese to take over Southeast Asia. He needs a confidential and responsible interlocutor to carry the message of U.S. attitudes to Hanoi. In outlining the U.S. position there was some discussion of "carrots and sticks." Pearson, after expressing willingness to lend Canadian good offices to this offer (which he did), indicated some concern about this nature of the "sticks." He stipulated that he would have great reservations about the use of nuclear weapons, but indicated that the punitive striking at discriminate targets by careful iron bomb attacks (high explosive) would be "quite a different thing." He said he would personally understand our resort to such measures if the messages transmitted through the Canadian channel failed to produce any alleviation of North Vietnamese aggression. And that Canada would transmit messages around this framework.

The Penatagon Papers also show that there was discussion in May of '64 before the Tonkin Gulf episodes of the possible later use of nuclear weapons in Viet Nam which I did not know at the time. I cannot believe I would have remained part of a bureaucracy that was considering the use of nuclear weapons as a first use in Viet Nam. I am certain that I would not. But I did not know that. I had a lot of clearances, as I've mentioned, but this was a secret from me as it was from many people. And I'm suggesting to you it is understandable why it remains top secret to this day. Especially that this was happening in 1964 at the onset of a campaign in which Barry Goldwater was being stigmatized as more than half mad.



In fact when the people were set out to go into my former psychiatrist's office to get material to blackmail me into silence, or to make me leave the country, or to commit suicide, in 1971 by Nixon, the people doing this were told that the President, among other things, like the idea...or rather Hunt, Howard Hunt, who was working for the President, of doing to Ellsberg what the psychiatrists did to Goldwater in 1964. A panel of psychiatrists, not their finest hour, released an ad and an article indicating that they found him psychologically unfit to be president—the kind of stigma Nixon thought it would be nice to lay on me—not that I was running for president.

But the basis of that statement essentially was that Goldwater was proposing the use of bombing and of nuclear weapons in a country in which this discussion was going on between the president and his ambassador and foreign powers, exactly. It has some bearing on the choice that the American people had to make at that time.

In Quemoy... I want to discuss it more later and I'll use the remaining time here till ten to make just a couple of comments that bear on what we've been talking about this time and last time. On the one hand, as you'll find out in there, virtually everyone agreed that Quemoy must be held. Quemoy was an island just six miles off mainland China on which Chiang (just a barren rock, basically) on which Chiang had put one third of his troops so that if he were to give in to the threats of the Communist Chinese against him it was true that he would... (I'm sorry, over here is what we have to look at.) In order to resist that he had changed the loss of Quemoy from the loss of a little rock, far away from

Taiwan where he was based, to a loss of a third of his army. Very big. "How can I accept? How can I be coerced at that point to give in," said Chiang? It was very clear that that was the purpose of his putting the troops there against the real desires of the Americans at that time.

The problem that the Americans saw—both military and civilian—was rather complicated. On the one hand, it was essential that Quemoy be held. Not because the one third troops even meant that much to us; certainly not because Quemoy meant anything at all. (Incidentally, again we had a situation where we were defending, as the rightful rulers of China, Chiang on Taiwan—on Formosa.) Again we had a situation where both Chiang and Mao Tse Tung claimed absolutely without any reservation that there was one China. They agreed on that. In fact both were determined that a "two China policy" not emerge.

In short it was being defined by both those people as a civil war and we went along with that. We were then as Dulles (you'll see in the notes here) occasionally alluded to—interfering in a civil war. Not a clearcut question of aggression specifically. Quemoy had always been considered as part of mainland China—a few miles off mainland China—very similar to Staten Island in effect. And Chiang agreed with Mao Tse Tung that Quemoy was part of mainland China, it was just that he disagreed as to who ran mainland China, or who was the rightful ruler of mainland China.

Had Quemoy, then been lost, it was agreed (you'll see in the documents here that I've put on reserve) we agreed with Chiang privately that the effect would be to lose Taiwan. Not by military attack,

interestingly, but by the psychological effect in Taiwan. Specifically, a majority of people on the island were Formosans, not Chinese, who were accepting quite a <sup>op</sup>pressive rule by Chiang's mainland Chinese troops. And the Chinese troops in turn maintained their allegiance to Chiang in what was basically a military dictatorship on the basis of the hope held out of the eventual return to China. Quemoy represented that hope. Basing people on this forward outpost represented a determination to return to China eventually. And had the troops been evacuated (which for military purposes all of our military would have liked to see—they did not want them in that exposed position) the danger was that Chiang would no longer retain his legitimacy as a military chieftain promising a return to China, and would be overthrown by his own people, or by the Formosans. So this danger then of a political domino if Quemoy should be lost. Because of the psychological effects. Each one, you'll see, of our military people, agreed that the effect of losing Quemoy was psychological, not military, but nevertheless worth a lot. How much?

Twining, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs (page 77 here) made it clear that the United States would have to use nuclear weapons against Chinese air bases to prevent a successful air interdiction campaign by the Chinese Communists. He noted that the U.S. military would begin by attacking a few of the fields in the Amoy area using low yield 10 to 15 kiloton nuclear weapons (that's Hiroshima size). At this point the Chinese Communists hopefully would break off. But if they did not the United States Twining indicated would have no alternative but to conduct nuclear strikes deep into China as far north as Shanghai.



The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs suggested this would almost certainly (now, here's a key point)... This was not 1953, this was not 1945. This was 1958. The Russians were in the process of deploying operational thermonuclear weapons. Not many that could reach the United States—hardly any—but quite a few that could reach our peripheral allies in Europe and in Asia. Very big.

Another point is you read in the Quemoy material which you should keep in mind that what I've been stressing—the enormous superiority of the U.S. at that time was not in the minds of our Joint Chiefs or the President in 1958—they thought the situation then was closely comparable to what it actually is now. So their willingness to use various kinds of these American military men and presidents to use threats of a certain sort are quite relevant. The military quite similar still.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs suggested this would almost certainly involve nuclear retaliation against Taiwan and possibly against Okinawa. But he stressed that if national policy is to defend the offshore islands then the consequences had to be accepted. The Chinese were not believed to have nuclear weapons but it was assumed that the Russians would retaliate. Later you'll find, (I won't take the time to quote it exactly here)... You'll find that estimates were made that the Russians would in fact retaliate by the CIA. And Khrushchev and Mao Tse Tung, Pam Van Dong, I'm sorry, Cho En Lai in China, specifically referred to the atomic blackmail by the U.S. and mentioned that it should be understood that they are now facing people with thermonuclear weapons of their own. This was not regarded as a bluff (although it was to a

considerable extent) by the U.S. In fact the message was gotten to us (indirectly through a complicated diplomatic channel like the Seaborne one that I've just described) from the Russians, that they would hit the 7th Fleet with nuclear weapons if we used nuclear weapons against them. This was never questioned by anybody in the crisis.

So these are the states they thought they were facing. If the... There are many points to be drawn here which I won't try to obviously do tonight. I want to come back just to one. What I just read to you was *about* part of the withheld parts of this study (still classified in other words)—likewise this meeting. Burk, the Chairman of the Chief of Naval Operations, arguing against the decision to depend initially on conventional forces, stated the U.S. could beat off an amphibious attack even with heavy bombing, only long enough to obtain authorization to use nuclear weapons. Therefore it might make more sense to use nuclear weapons immediately.

Taylor countered that therefore Burk was at least agreeing it was not necessary to have authority to have nuclear weapons immediately, but he also agreed (Taylor, the Chairman of the Army) that it would be necessary to use nuclear weapons if the Chinese Communists were able to and did maintain the attack. It was generally agreed—this was a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dulles—that if the Chinese persisted, nuclear weapons would have to be used. Dulles summarized the agreement then by noting that it was not necessary to use nuclear weapons immediately as Chinese junks approached Quemoy, but that they would have to be used ultimately against a determined enemy prepared to accept the large

casualties that could be inflicted by conventional bombing. This made sharper the unanimous belief that this would have to be quickly followed by nuclear strikes unless the Chinese Communists called off the operation. They all agreed. Seven to ten kiloton air burst weapons, five coastal airfields, one bomb per field, a limited use, and so forth.

The President ratified this thinking. Dulles repeated the point that he had made at a previous meeting; that if we shrank from using nuclear weapons when military circumstances required, we would have to reconsider our whole defense posture. We were facing tough questions. Burk retorted that if they are not faced now, they would be harder later. We must, he said, get used to the fact that nuclear weapons must be used. This planning was ratified by President Eisenhower in the next couple of days, who authorized the Joint Chiefs to plan on the use of nuclear weapons, not immediately as they most of them desired aside from Taylor, but if the Communists did not back off under the earliest use of conventional weapons, after which they could plan on nuclear weapons. However, he retained the authority in the planning (in the open planning which was only top secret, as this study is only top secret) that the President himself would determine the use of nuclear weapons, authorization. A funny ambiguity arose in a press conference relating to that question.

Now I'm going to close here by drawing attention in the light of this to one further thing which is not in this study (and which has not been disclosed to this day). On September 2nd, around the time of that meeting, Eisenhower was asked whether he had given authority to use



nuclear weapons to field commanders at their own discretion. And he replied, "It is not possible to use these weapons except with the specific authority of the President." However, he went on to say that he could not remember if there were specific circumstances of self defense in which this prohibition would not apply. Of course the whole operation was defined as self defense by us. So that led to some interest in the newspapers at that time.

And a little bit later his press secretary, Haggerty, was questioned, (this is on page 228) was questioned about a statement by Eisenhower at his press conference that he was uncertain (Haggerty) as to the discretion, oh, I'm sorry, that Eisenhower was uncertain as to the discretion of commanders in the field to use nuclear weapons. And he stated that Eisenhower had not checked on this yet. Dulles later said there is no authority to use these except as authorized by the President.

The implication was, of course, that the President himself must personally make the decision at the time. That wasn't true, and Halperin did not know that in writing this report in 1964 when he wrote it. I knew it because my work had been command and control analysis in the Pacific for the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Felt, who had been CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief at the time of the Quemoy crisis. In fact I was there in '59, a year later. I also spoke for Felt to Admiral Smoot who was Commander in Taiwan of the Taiwan Defense Command and to the Commander of the 7th Fleet on command and control problems. And I spoke to all their nuclear control officers.

I learned something then which I wasn't sure Washington knew. That there was a belief among the high level atomic control officers in the

Pacific that Eisenhower had sent signed letters to his unified and specified commanders—his regional theater commanders—including CINCPAC, authorizing them to use nuclear weapons under certain specific circumstances without an explicit immediate authorization from the President. Two circumstances in particular along with a crisis, an attack that made them believe they needed nuclear weapons. In addition to that communications must be out with the President—the telephone line to Washington should be out. They were then authorized if necessary to use nuclear weapons on their own authority. Or if the President should be incapacitated as Eisenhower had recently been by a heart attack, or a stroke (I forget what his recent incapacitation had been). He had been out of it and that was another of the circumstances.

This was one of the most closely guarded secrets—if it were true at all in the Pacific. I learned this in '59, in '60. I reported it through various channels. I worried about it. What worried me was not that 4-star admirals had been given that capability because there was a real problem of the telephone line being out. Communications in those days (before a lot of satellites) to CINCPAC in Hawaii—Commander-in-Chief Pacific in Hawaii—were out part of every day. And communications from Hawaii to the Western Pacific were also out part of every day on the average. So that authority (if it were really existent) was in effect part of every day if the Chinese should choose to attack during that period. And this crisis a year earlier, when that authority was in existence, had gone on for a matter of a couple of months.

I'll go into this story in detail now. There is an interest to it because I reported to McGeorge Bundy in early '61 this belief in the

Pacific that such letters existed. And I asked him if he knew that there were such letters (he had just gotten into the White House). He said he did not know. He was the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (what later Kissinger was, what Bush is in effect now, part of the time and various people have played this role). Brent Scowcroft (??) and various people have done it more recently.

He said he didn't know and he delegated me to find out. I was named a one-man investigation study for the White House on Presidential Command and Control to find out if such letters existed; because they wanted to know before they took any action, and they didn't like to ask and perhaps be lied to. They wanted it investigated, actually first with my contacts, whether we could pin down the existence of such letters.

Briefly I tried for a couple of months. I was assured by many people, (including the President's Naval Aide, who controlled the football, the codes and so forth), that there was no such authorization made by Eisenhower to his knowledge. This was the man who controlled the go codes for the President. He was wrong. And later told me that he had not lied to me, he simply had not known of the existence of these letters. They were discovered by Bundy's office in June of 1961 or six months into the President's first term. His commanders in the field were holding such authorizations, delegation to use those weapons. At which point Kennedy renewed them in his own name. I asked Bundy's assistant who told me this, "Why do you do that?"

I forgot to say what worried me about the situation was not that the 4-star admirals and generals including NATO had that authorization, but



my knowledge for sure that, whether or not such letters existed, that authorization had been delegated down to lower levels of command for the same reason. Communications tended to be out. And in case they were needed to be used, each commander in turn had made the delegation that it turns out that the President had made to CINCPAC and to NATO. I was sure the White House did not know that, had not intended that people down to the level of 7th Fleet or much lower than that had actually gotten this authorization. They didn't know it as far as I know, was told. But they renewed it.

As Bundy's assistant said (this was after the Bay of Pigs) "This is not the month for Lt. Kennedy," (his wartime rank) "to reverse the decision of the great general." Interestingly Johnson renewed that authorization. So the main number one issue of the campaign which (I haven't mentioned it before) which pivoted on Goldwater's assertion that delegation should be given to the commanders in the field to use what he called "small, conventional nuclear weapons" on their own authority

CHANGE TAPE SIDE

that was the number one issue against Goldwater in the campaign which led to the landslide, the greatest in our history against Goldwater at that point. Johnson said in his opening campaign speech in my hometown of Detroit (used to be the traditional place for Democrats to open the campaign) he chose this issue. He said, "There is no such thing as a small conventional nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons average the size of

Hiroshima weapons," (which is true). "They all threaten total devastation. No one can promise the control of a nuclear war. No one can start nuclear war except by the President. The President cannot delegate that authority because it would be totally irresponsible to do so and I will never do it."

But he had done it. As had Kennedy and Eisenhower. Has Nixon done it? Carter done it? Reagan done it? I don't know. I do know that three presidents who said they hadn't, had done it, and for the same reason that Eisenhower did it. Which means that there is one aspect that I want you to know about this Quemoy crisis that you will not learn from Halperin's study. What you will learn is that Eisenhower had deliberately in effect, passed the trigger on American nuclear weapons to the Chinese, in the sense that he had let the Chinese know (and it was the truth) that he had decided that the planning should be nothing other than for nuclear weapons.

{ There was no planning for major limited war in Quemoy if the Chinese did not back down from the barrage of that island, or if they attempted to invade. No plan at the highest level was allowed to exist calling for large-scale, prolonged, conventional operation. There were some plans at the lower levels but that was in ignorance of the high-level planning. In that sense, then, he had done what he could to remove this. However, if you read the study you'll get the impression that Eisenhower had at least reserved for himself a last minute chance to change his mind—if the attack had occurred in good atmospheric conditions for high frequency transmission. What Halperin did not know was that the trigger for our

nuclear weapons had also passed from Washington if the Chinese did attack in bad weather, or in the kinds of atmospheric conditions that prevailed part of every day.

The 7th Fleet and CINCPAC had the authority to respond on the basis of plans which (this study will show you) every one of these agents did believe that we should use nuclear weapons, must use nuclear weapons, and had, in fact, no qualms about it. That is a form of what I've called in general terms this madman approach. In this case delegation. It was delegation of authority which we had not refrained from doing in a period when we regarded the chance of that triggering—the effect of that triggering—to be the likelihood of massive regional war.

There is a lesson, I think to be drawn about what this president may be deciding and future presidents may be deciding and the responsibility with which they may be dealing with our nuclear weapons.

I know it's the end and I have three minutes left and I'm going to take them. It is this, I'll just quote this. Some of you heard it last time. We'll talk about it next time. Haldeman's account, his memoirs in 1978. "When Nixon spoke of his desire to be a peacemaker he once said, 'I'm the one man in this country who can do it,'" (meaning end the war in his first year). "He was going to end it the way Eisenhower had ended it in 1953," (ended the Korean War). "Eisenhower's military background had convinced the Communists he was sincere in his threat in '53. Nixon didn't have that background but he believed his hardline anti Communist rhetoric of twenty years would serve to convince the North Vietnamese equally as well that he really meant to do what he said. The



threat was the key. Nixon coined a phrase for his theory which I'm sure will bring smiles of delight to Nixon haters everywhere. We were walking along a foggy beach after a long day of speech writing. He said, 'I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that for God's sake you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry and he has his hand on the nuclear button and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.'

Next time I'll be talking about Nixon's secret strategy to win the war which did exist, and which came close to succeeding. I've talked about it a bit before but I'll close with one line from Nixon's memoirs. "In early July of 1969 I decided to try once again to cut through whatever genuine doubts or misunderstandings might still be holding Hanoi back. The plans were described by Kissinger to his staff (the people who later left after Cambodia in 1969) as a savage blow which was to break the back of the Vietnamese and demonstrate to them that a 4th rate power could not stand up to the world's mightiest power. When pointed out by these people that they had already experienced one and a half WW IIs of bombing on them (this was in October '69 this discussion was going on, the ultimatum was for November 3rd) when they said these people have already stood up to three million tons of bombs what will cause them to give in? Kissinger's answer was, "I do not believe that this is the first people in history to have no breaking point." And their job was to find the savage blow that would be the breaking point.

Nixon's description of that planning was this. "In July I decided to go for broke in the sense that I would attempt to end the war one way or the other." Either by negotiated agreement or by an increased use of force. We'll talk about that next time.